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ABStrAct
this article considers whether ‘substantive equality’, as a transformative idea and legal 
mechanism in the South African constitution, can generate legal solutions and court deci-
sions that may result in transformative change. It does so by establishing a framework for 
analysing the ‘inclusionary’ or ‘transformatory’ effects of equality cases in relation to gender 
and sexual orientation. It argues that the idea of substantive equality is capable of addressing 
diverse forms of social and economic inequality, and that the legal form of substantive equal-
ity adopted by the constitutional court, emphasising context, impact, difference and values, 
has some potential for achieving meaningful social and economic change by and through 
courts. However, the manner is which the court has engaged with this legal form suggests 
that the transformative possibilities of equality are constrained by a number of factors. 
these include institutional concerns, the capacity and willingness of judges to recognise and 
address the multiple systemic inequalities that still pervade our society as well as their ability 
to develop a consistently transformative jurisprudence that applies the ideas of substantive 
equality to the concepts and doctrines that underpin many equality claims.
i introduCtion
this article engages the idea that ‘equality’ in the South African constitution 
can generate legal solutions and court decisions that may result in transforma-
tive change in South Africa. It does so by identifying the possibilities of 
‘substantive equality’ as a transformative idea and legal mechanism, before 
analysing some of the constitutional court’s equality cases that deal with 
issues of social transformation (gender and sexual orientation). the article 
suggests that the idea of substantive equality contemplates both social and 
economic change and is capable of addressing diverse forms of inequality 
that arise from a multiplicity of social and economic causes. In addition, the 
legal form of substantive equality adopted by the constitutional court, with 
its emphasis on context, impact, difference and values, has some potential for 
achieving meaningful social and economic change by and through courts.
However, the manner is which the court has engaged (or refrained from 
engaging) with context, difference and values in its equality cases suggests 
that the transformative possibilities of equality are constrained. the con-
straints include, inter alia, institutional concerns (questions of the separation 
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of powers and institutional legitimacy), the capacity and willingness of judges 
to recognise and address the multiple systemic inequalities that still pervade 
our society (particularly in exploring ‘context’), and the ability of judges to 
develop a jurisprudence that applies transformative ideas to the concepts and 
doctrines that underpin many equality claims.
this article argues that, despite the broad reach of constitutional protec-
tion of equality, there remain clear legal and social boundaries that are both 
normative and doctrinal, that sustain conventionally gendered ideas of society 
— women, family, marriage and sexuality. As a result, equality jurisprudence 
has broadened the net of ‘inclusion’, but has not necessarily dislodged the 
underlying social framework. For the equality jurisprudence to be truly 
‘transformative’, rather than merely ‘inclusionary’, the legal application of 
substantive equality needs to be more conceptually consistent. this requires 
it to be embedded in a broader transformative jurisprudence that is better 
able to understand systemic inequalities (social context) and to overcome 
legal formalism, especially the chilling effect of traditional legal concepts 
and doctrines on transformative outcomes.
Part II explores the meaning of substantive equality in South Africa, and 
its relationship to inclusionary or transformative change. Part III discusses 
the legal rules of substantive equality followed, in part IV, by an analysis of 
selected constitutional court cases concerning sex, gender, marital status and 
sexual orientation discrimination. Part V discusses the implications of this 
analysis for the transformative use of substantive equality.
ii SubStantive equality and tranSFormation
the call for ‘substantive’ equality emerges from particular understandings 
of inequality as rooted in political, social and economic cleavages between 
groups, rather than the result of arbitrary or irrational action. It acknowledges 
the complexity of inequality, its systemic nature and its entrenchment in 
social values and behaviours, the institutions of society, the economic system 
and power relations.
A constitutional commitment to substantive equality is thus also a com-
mitment to the eradication of such systemic inequalities. It establishes an 
aspirational ideal — the achievement of a society based on equality2 — and 
presumes that this is (at least partly) possible through law. In a constitutional 
sense, therefore, substantive equality is both a value and a legally enforce-
able right.3 In addition, in South Africa, the value and the right of substantive 
 In South Africa, the political claim for substantive equality emerged from the constitutional negotia-
tions of the early 990s, mostly from the women’s movement. See c Albertyn ‘Women and the 
transition to democracy in South Africa’ in c Murray (ed) Gender and The New South African 
Legal Order (994); S Hassim Women’s Organizations and Democracy in South Africa (2006) 
chapter 5. It has also been a dominant theme in South African constitutional scholarship. 
2 See the preamble and s  of the constitution.
3 on this distinction, Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention 2005 (3) SA 
20 (cc) para 2.
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equality are both central to ideas of social and economic ‘transformation’ and 
the role of the law in achieving this.
In thinking more deeply about the nature and possibilities of substantive 
equality in South Africa, it is useful to differentiate between different forms 
of inequality in order to analyse the extent to which different constitutional 
claims, based on such inequalities, are understood and addressed. For the 
purpose of argument, I will distinguish between social and economic equality 
claims, and between claims based on, and/or that result in, inclusion and trans-
formation.4 However, the analysis that follows is limited to social claims.
different groups in society experience a different mix of political, social and 
economic inequalities, giving rise different kinds of equality claims. Social 
inequalities result in patterns of inclusion and exclusion in which the identity, 
culture, values and behaviours of a particular group are stigmatized, mar-
ginalised and/or denigrated, while another group is affirmed and privileged. 
Such exclusion may reflect or result in increased vulnerability to physical and 
psychological violence and to political marginalisation. claims arising out of 
these inequalities tend to emphasise what nancy Fraser has called ‘recogni-
tion’, asserting the social identities and values of the excluded group.5 In South 
Africa, many of the claims brought by gay and lesbian groups have been claims 
for social recognition of gay and lesbian identities, relationships and families.6 
In addition, the equality claims by customary wives,7 cohabiting partners and 
sex workers9 discussed in this article are also, arguably, fundamentally claims 
for social recognition.
Equality claims may also arise out of economic inequalities, manifest in the 
unequal access to, and distribution of, basic needs, opportunities and material 
resources. these claims emphasise economic inclusion, and might also entail 
a claim for a (re)distribution of resources. Although these are not discussed 
further in this article,0 South African courts have considered both defensive 
and positive claims about economic inequality. In Van Heerden v Minister of 
Finance11 the constitutional court was asked to defend a positive measure 
that sought to equalize pension benefits by subsidizing the contributions of 
members of a disadvantaged group. this case suggests that the courts will 
4 I have identified these distinctions elsewhere. See c Albertyn ‘defending and Securing rights 
through Law: Women, Law and the courts in South Africa’ (2005) 32 Politikon 27; c Albertyn 
‘Equality’ in E Bonthuys & c Albertyn Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 2.
5 n Fraser Justice Interruptus (997).
6 In particular, the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
(999)  SA 6 (cc).
7 Bhe v Magistrate, Khayalitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the 
RSA 2005  SA 50 (cc).
 Volks NO v Robinson 2005 (5) BcLr 446 (cc).
9 Jordan v The State 2002 (6) SA 642 (cc).
0 I have discussed this elsewhere. See c Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Equality’ in S Woolman et al 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2 ed 2007) 35, 2–4, 29–42. See also S Liebenberg 
& B Goldblatt ‘the Interrelationship between Equality and Socio-Economic rights under South 
Africa’s transformative constitution’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 335.
 2004 (6) SA 2 (cc).
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largely defer to government measures,2 and it remains an open question as to 
how far courts may nudge government in more transformative, redistributive 
directions.3 In Khosa v Minister of Social Development,4 a case assisted by 
the conflation of equality and the right to social assistance, destitute perma-
nent residents successfully claimed the extension of social benefits to them.5
In truth, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups usually experience a mix 
of inequalities, and many claims include aspects of both social and economic 
equality. Gender based claims are thus often claims for equal social recogni-
tion in order to achieve a fairer distribution of resources. the relationship 
between claims for social recognition and claims for redistribution is an issue 
that is discussed later.
the second distinction is between equality claims that result in ‘inclusion’ 
and those that contribute to, and result in, ‘transformation’. An inclusive 
approach to equality would align with a liberal idea of inclusion into the sta-
tus quo (and may even be achieved through formal equality alone). Inclusion 
broadens the umbrella of social recognition, but does not address the struc-
tural conditions that create and perpetuate systemic inequalities. nancy 
Fraser uses the term ‘affirmative’ change to describe a similar process. She 
speaks of ‘remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes without dis-
turbing the underlying framework that generates them’.6 on the other hand, 
a ‘transformatory’ approach aims to address such inequalities, and thus to 
shift the power relations that maintain the status quo. Fraser speaks of ‘rem-
edies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring 
the underlying generative framework’.7 to illustrate by way of example: An 
inclusionary approach to women would recognize their disadvantage as moth-
ers and accommodate this without shifting the underlying ideas of gender 
that establish different, unequal and static roles and institutional positions for 
women and men as parents, workers and members of society. A transforma-
tory approach would locate an understanding of women’s disadvantage within 
these systemic inequalities, and then seek to dismantle them through new 
normative interpretations of equality and through remedies that affirm a more 
egalitarian and flexible set of gender roles, and thus dislodge the underlying 
norms and structures that create and reinforce a rigid and hierarchical status 
quo. In sexual orientation claims, an inclusionary approach would affirm the 
identity of gay and lesbian people on an equal basis with heterosexual indi-
viduals and families. A transformatory approach would contemplate a more 
radical understanding of society in which dominant heterosexual norms give 
way to a plurality of families and relationships.
2 Albertyn & Goldblatt (2007) (note 0 above) 40.
3 Ibid 40–42. 
4 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 
505 (cc).
5 See Albertyn & Goldblatt (2007) (note 0 above) 4–42; Liebenberg & Goldblatt (note 0 above) 
34–350.
6 Fraser (note 5 above) 23.
7 Ibid.
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Several scholars of South African constitutionalism have addressed the idea 
of transformative constitutionalism. Substantive equality is closely related to 
this idea in South African constitutional discourse, and for some legal schol-
ars and constitutional court justices, the idea of substantive equality entails 
‘transformatory’ change.9 recently, Langa cJ described the achievement of 
substantive equality as requiring a social and economic revolution in which 
all enjoy equal access to the resources and amenities of life, and are able 
to develop to their full human potential.20 this requires the dismantling of 
systemic inequalities, the eradication of poverty and disadvantage (economic 
equality) and the affirmation of human identity and capabilities (social equal-
ity). It also confirms a strong relationship between substantive equality and 
the achievement of socio-economic rights.2 Such an approach coincides, 
in theory, with the understanding of transformatory change set out above. 
However, the idea of transformation is a politically and legally contested 
space22 in which the possibilities of substantive equality/transformation are 
limited by ‘inclusionary’ approaches and remedies or bolstered by those that 
are truly ‘transformatory’. one would thus expect transformatory claims for 
social, cultural or political recognition, at minimum, to dislodge the domi-
nant and systemic cultural and social norms and stereotypes that suppress 
and subordinate unequal groups, and to engage in the creation of new norms 
of equality. transformatory claims for redistribution, although lodged in a 
complex series of economic issues, should, at a minimum, enable forms of 
economic redistribution, and seek to reduce rather than entrench poverty and 
inequality.
Much of the discourse of substantive equality and transformation is located 
in the realm of constitutional values, establishing the vision of the constitution. 
It is an aspiration, a goal that our society seeks to achieve.23 to what extent can 
legal claims for equality under s 9 of the constitution close the gap between 
that aspiration and the reality? Can s 9 equality claims result in ‘transforma-
tory change’ that goes beyond the inclusion and accommodation of unequal 
groups, such as black people or women, to trigger and/or effect a deeper shift 
 the idea of transformative constitutionalism was arguably first expressed by Karl Klare in ‘Legal 
culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (99) 4 SAJHR 46.
9 c Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development 
of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality’ (99) 4 SAJHR 24; M Pieterse ‘What do we Mean 
when we Talk about Transformative Constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 SAPL 55; A J van der Walt 
‘Legal History, Legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy’ (2006) 2 
Fundamina ; P de Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as 
contextual Fairness’ (200) 7 SAJHR 25.
20 P Langa ‘transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 Stell LR 35, 352–353 citing Albertyn & 
Goldblatt ibid.
2 For a discussion on the relationship between equality and socio-economic rights see Goldblatt & 
Liebenberg (note 0 above).
22 Henk Botha and Johan van der Walt have both written about transformation as a permanent ideal, 
in which new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected. H Botha 
‘Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism’ 2002 TSAR 62; 2003 TSAR 20; J 
van der Walt Law and Sacrifice (2005).
23 I have discussed this further in Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 0 above) –5, 3–4.
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in the systemic inequalities of our society? Is this possible through a legal 
approach to substantive equality?
iii SubStantive equality in law
Part of the answer to these questions lies in the nature of ‘substantive 
equality’ law and jurisprudence in South Africa. Legal ideas of substantive 
equality differ across jurisdictions and are often linked to the particular legal 
precedents and debates within such jurisdictions.24 the legal promotion of 
substantive equality in any one jurisdiction will almost inevitably focus on 
overcoming existing limitations in anti-discrimination laws and constitutional 
jurisprudence. As described elsewhere in this volume, this might include the 
strengthening of indirect discrimination or the inclusion of positive measures 
within anti-discrimination laws, or a concern with the application of values 
in equality jurisprudence.25 the development of substantive equality in South 
African constitutional jurisprudence was not constrained by pre-existing 
equality regimes, thus providing the opportunity to develop a constitutional 
understanding of equality de novo. It was also shaped by a political context 
of democratic change, and a global legal context that provided comparative 
examples of the limitations of ‘formal equality’ and some jurisprudential 
precedents for a ‘substantive’ approach.26
the legal application of ‘substantive equality’ in South Africa has been 
developed at some length by the constitutional court. Although there has 
been some unevenness in the court’s approach, substantive equality has at 
least four characteristics, endorsed by the constitutional court, that give it 
‘transformative potential’: an emphasis on understanding inequality within its 
social and historic context; a primary concern with the impact of the alleged 
inequality on the complainant; a recognition of difference as a positive feature 
of society; and attention to the purpose of the right and its underlying values 
in a manner that evinces a direct or indirect concern with remedying systemic 
subordination27  or  disadvantage.2 An additional feature of transformative 
substantive equality, achieved through the application of the above, would be 
its ability to affirm or imagine a future society through practical (remedies) 
and normative (values) means. underlying all of these characteristics is a nec-
essary retreat from legal formalism and an understanding of law as a product 
of social relations that can be re-inscribed with transformative ends.
24 For example, Sandra Fredman has identified at least four ‘overlapping’ approaches to substan-
tive equality: Equality of results, equal opportunities; substantive rights and a broad value driven 
approach. S Fredman Discrimination Law (2002).
25 See eg S Mullally ‘Substantive Equality and Positive duties in Ireland’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 29.; c 
Barnard & B Hepple ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59 Cambridge LJ 562.
26 the call for substantive equality in law has important roots in feminist legal theory, and its exposure 
of the law’s failure to address the concrete inequalities of women. on the global impact on consti-
tutionalism generally, see H Klug Constituting Democracy (2000).
27 c Pateman ‘Equality, difference, Subordination: the Politics of Motherhood and Women’s 
citizenship’ in G Bock & S James Beyond Equality and Difference (992) 7, 2.
2 d rhode ‘the Politics of Paradigms’ in Bock & James ibid 49. See also r colker ‘Section , 
contextuality and the Anti-disadvantage Principle’ (992) 42 University of Toronto LJ 77.
25 (2007) 23 SAJHR
a) Context and impact
Substantive equality is understood as a remedy to systemic and entrenched 
inequalities. this requires that judges and lawyers understand the context in 
which inequality occurs, and identify the social and economic conditions that 
structure action and create unequal and exclusionary consequences for groups 
and individuals.29 the interrogation of the actual social, political and legal 
context in which an alleged rights violation occurs requires an examination 
of the substantive arrangements that determine a group’s social or economic 
position,30 including the relationship between disadvantaged or vulnerable 
groups and more powerful and privileged groups. care should be taken to 
avoid the use of a comparator that intentionally or inadvertently reproduces 
inequalities because it reinforces dominant norms and standards. closely 
related to context is the investigation of the impact of the impugned action on 
the individual and her group. Equality claims are thus assessed in relation to 
lived inequalities. Such lived realities have no formal boundaries, meaning 
that courts must interrogate the private sphere and understand the relationship 
between law and social arrangements.
Attention to context and impact are both central to equality jurisprudence 
in South Africa. In the adjudication of unfair discrimination under s 9(3), the 
impact of the discrimination on the complainant and his or her group is said to 
be determinative.3 this enquiry is described as a contextual one that consid-
ers, inter alia, the position of the complainant in society and whether she has 
suffered from past patterns of disadvantage.32 the constitutional court has 
described its approach as ‘comprehensive and nuanced’33 in which all relevant 
factors have to be considered.
As will be demonstrated below, the manner in which courts engage these 
enquiries is a key determinant of the outcome of a case and a crucial indicator 
of the achievement of substantive equality through law. Important also is the 
extent to which the cases comprehend the systemic foundations of inequal-
ity, and are able to identify practical and normative solutions that begin to 
dismantle these inequalities.
29 A contextual approach was adopted by the canadian Supreme court in the case of Andrews v Law 
Society of British Columbia [99]  Scr 43. In the same case, the court found that ‘to approach 
the ideal of full equality before and under the law, the main consideration must be the impact on the 
individual or group concerned’ (at 65).
30 See also, the work of Martha Minow who argues that difference does not inhere in the individual 
or group but in the relation between individuals and/or groups. It is not the characteristics of the 
individual or the group that are the concern, but the social arrangements that make these matter. See 
M Minow ‘the Supreme court 96 term, Foreword: Justice Engendered’ (97–) 0 Harvard 
LR 0 and M Minow Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (990).
3 See President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 997 (4) SA  (cc) para 43; Harksen v Lane 
NO 99 () SA 300 (cc) para 5 and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Justice (note 6 above) para 9.
32 Hugo ibid para 37; Harken ibid.
33 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (note 6 above) para 9.
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b) Difference
It is widely recognised that the problem of inequality is not difference per 
se, but rather the manner in which difference is tied to hierarchies, exclu-
sion and disadvantage. The South African Constitutional Court has affirmed 
the importance of difference as a positive feature of society.34 An important 
indicator of the law’s capacity to dismantle systemic inequalities lies in its 
ability to deal with difference in a practical and normative manner. In a 
transformative approach, the law should be able to prohibit difference linked 
to discrimination at the same time as it affirms positive and future forms 
of difference and diversity. Fundamental to this is the ability to facilitate or 
establish new, and non-hierarchical, normative frameworks of participation 
and social inclusion.
As seen below, one of the barriers to the transformative use of equality 
is the use of a hidden or visible comparator that tends to reinforce existing 
hierarchies of difference, rather than shift them.
d) Purpose and values
the adjudication of equality claims should be grounded in a discussion of the 
purpose of the right and the values that underlie it.35 While an analysis of the 
context in which the alleged violation occurs enhances the court’s understand-
ing of the legal claim, a clear exposition of the purpose of the right, and of the 
constitutional values that underpin it, provide the court with crucial signposts 
to a decision most faithful to the constitution. Again, as discussed below, the 
content given to the purpose and values influences whether a particular case 
takes a transformative or inclusionary turn.
Feminist and other legal scholars have argued that the purpose and principles 
of equality should be derived from an understanding of systemic inequalities 
and the goal of removing them. the principles of anti-subordination and anti-
disadvantage are important for achieving transformative ends. this has been 
partly captured in South African jurisprudence in relation to s 9(2) on posi-
tive measures, where the redistributive nature of equality is also discussed. 36 
the principles are also present in the determination of unfair discrimination 
in s 9(3), both independently as a consideration in the fairness enquiry, and 
(to a lesser extent) in the value of dignity, the primary value underlying this 
section of the right. However, the purpose and values underpinning equality 
have also been mechanisms for shaping its boundaries and have not always 
served a transformative purpose.37 Finally, one would also expect the courts’ 
discussion of purpose and values to set transformative aspirational ideals. As 
discussed below, this has often proved elusive.
34 Ibid. 
35 See colker (note 2 above). this approach was adopted by the canadian Supreme court in Andrews 
note 29 above, 7 and by the South African constitutional court in its early equality cases (note 3 
above). 
36 See Albertyn & Goldblatt (2007) (note 0 above) 30–3.
37 Ibid –4.
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the next sections ask whether and how South Africa’s equality jurisprudence 
has been socially transformative in relation to gender and sexual orientation. 
Limitations of space mean that the discussion is necessarily brief and the sec-
tions merely highlight key cases against the backdrop of the jurisprudence as 
a whole. the cases have been chosen because they illustrate the positive and 
negative boundaries of substantive equality and the extent to which we can 
call it ‘transformative’ in the sense identified in this article. As mentioned 
above, they focus on claims of social rather then economic equality.
iv gender, equality and tranSFormation
there have been nine constitutional court decisions concerned with gender, 
including claims based on marital status, but excluding claims based on sexual 
orientation (a separate ground in South Africa). these cases relate to issues 
of property and access to family resources,3 bodily freedom39 and parent-
ing.40 In this section, I analyse four cases as examples of the legal application 
of substantive equality: Firstly, President of the RSA v Hugo41 (on gender 
roles) and Masiya v DPP42 (on gender based violence and women’s victim-
hood/autonomy) largely to explore the transformative potential of cases that 
apparently show a significant understanding of systemic gender inequalities. 
Secondly, Volks NO v Robinson43 on women’s choices and alternative rela-
tionships) and Jordan v The State44 (on women’s choices and sex work) are 
discussed for their clear illustration of the social and doctrinal boundaries of 
equality protection.
a) Gender roles (parenting)
Fixed and hierarchical gender roles, in which women are relegated to specific, 
and naturalised, roles in the family and home, rather than the public sphere, 
have been a fundamental source of gender inequality in many societies. A 
transformative legal approach to these issues would see the courts demon-
strate an understanding of these systemic gender inequalities, the manner 
in which gender roles have become linked to relations of power, and how 
motherhood can be a practical and normative barrier to women succeeding 
3 Brink v Kitshoff 996 (6) BcLr 752 (cc) concerned discrimination in the treatment of husbands 
and wives in relation to life insurance policies; in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2007 () SA 
76 (cc) the constitutional court considered a legislative scheme which prevented a spouse mar-
ried in community of property (but not out of community of property) from claiming patrimonial 
damages ‘in respect of bodily injuries suffered by him and attributable either wholly or partly to the 
fault of that spouse’; Harksen v Lane NO (note 3 above) concerned sex/gender or marital status 
discrimination in insolvency law affecting the rights of insolvent spouses vis a vis each other; Volks 
NO v Robinson (note  above) was a claim by a co-habiting partner for maintenance from the estate 
of her deceased partner.
39 Jordan note 9 above; Masiya v DPP unreported, cct 2006/54 (0 May 2007).
40 Hugo note 3 above; Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North 997 (2) SA 26 (cc).
4 Ibid.
42 note 39 above.
43 note  above.
44 note 9 above.
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in the public sphere (in education and the workplace). However, it would also 
provide a public interpretation of equality or a remedy that would contribute 
to the subversion of unequal gender roles. two constitutional court cases 
have concerned gender roles, both brought by men.45 this discussion focuses 
on Hugo.46 this was the court’s second equality case concerning an equal-
ity challenge to a presidential decree that gave amnesty to women prisoners 
with children under twelve years, but not to men prisoners who were fathers 
of such children. The President had justified his decision on the basis of the 
needs of children and the ‘special role … that mothers play in the care and 
nurturing of younger children’.47 the court found the preference of mothers 
over fathers to be fair discrimination.4
Hugo was a difficult case for many reasons.49 However, for the constitutional 
court it was an early opportunity to talk about gender equality and women’s 
burdens in a political context that had affirmed gender equality as a dominant 
democratic value.50 For a court that was but three years old, such an opportu-
nity to build legitimacy proved irresistible. Its conclusion that women’s role 
as mothers justified the benefit of an early release, to the exclusion of fathers, 
was generally welcomed by feminist and critical scholars for its attention to 
the context of women’s lives, and its recognition of the responsibilities and 
complexities of motherhood. the court willingly took judicial notice of the 
fact that ‘mothers… bear more responsibilities for child-rearing in our society 
than do fathers’,5 that this was often borne without skills or resources, that 
it was ‘one of the causes of the deep inequalities experienced by women in 
employment’,52 and one of the reasons historically for excluding them from 
public life.53
At the same time, there was some disquiet about the judgment’s dismissal 
of the small, but vulnerable group of fathers who are single parents and care- 
45 Fraser (note 40 above) is not discussed here. It concerned the rights of a biological father to consent 
to the adoption of his baby. the case was decided on the basis of marital status, not sex/gender 
discrimination.
46 note 3 above.
47 Ibid para 35.
4 Ibid para 47.
49 the case has been criticised for being heard at all, and there was some disagreement amongst the 
judges as to whether the case was wholly academic and effectively moot (didcott J paras 54–62); 
whether prerogative powers were indeed reviewable executive powers (Kriegler J para 65); whether 
a prerogative constituted a law of general application (Mokgoro J paras 95–04). All judges agreed 
that it was a very difficult case. Subsequently, it has been suggested that the matter should rather 
have been decided as a defence of positive measure under s (2) of the interim constitution 
(Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 5 above) 79). 
50 the role of gender equality in the constitutional negotiations and its eventual place as a key demo-
cratic value is discussed in Albertyn (note  above) and Hassim (note  above). See also s  of the 
constitution. 
5 note 3 above, para 37.
52 Ibid para 3.
53 Ibid para 39. See also o’regan J’s minority, but concurring, judgment paras 09–0.
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givers.54 It was suggested that the recognition of this group might have resulted 
in a more ‘transformative’ judgment as it would have begun to break down the 
sex-based barriers of gender.55 A second issue concerned the judgment’s reliance 
on women’s role as mothers in a manner that reinforced, rather than transformed, 
stereotypical gender roles. Here the judgment exhibits an unresolved tension 
between the need to address women’s current conditions of inequality and the 
need to transform them.56 the court’s inability to transcend this tension through 
a practical recognition of disadvantage, coupled with a normative assertion of 
a more equal society in which women and men are free to make choices about 
their lives and are not subordinated by patriarchal gender roles,57 ultimately limits 
the transformative possibilities of this case. despite its progressive recognition 
of the systemic inequalities of the sexual division of labour, neither the remedy 
nor the jurisprudence takes a further step towards dismantling that disadvantage 
and setting the terms for more egalitarian society. In its competing judgements, 
the court treats the need to protect women in their gender roles and the need to 
transform these roles as mutually exclusive. It thus ends up protecting women 
within the status quo, and normatively affirms their traditional gender roles as 
mothers.
b) Violence and victims
Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions58 was an appeal against a conviction 
in the regional Magistrates court (and then the High court) for rape in which 
the courts had developed the common law definition or rape (limited to vaginal 
penetration by a male penis) to include ‘acts of non-consensual sexual pen-
etration of the male sexual organ into the vagina or anus of another person’.59 
the constitutional court was asked to determine whether this development 
was consistent with the Constitution. Nkabinde J’s majority judgment finds 
that, although the current definition was consistent with the Constitution, the 
development of the common law is necessary in ‘the interests of justice’ and 
for the proper realisation of the principles, ideals and values underlying the 
Constitution. The Court develops the definition to include anal penetration of 
54 the court majority considered and dismissed this group for administrative rather than equity rea-
sons (para 4). In her minority judgment Mokgoro J found that ‘stereotypical ideas concerning 
men’s aptitude at child rearing is an infringement upon their equality and dignity’ (para 92). See also 
Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 5 above); K van Marle ‘Equality: An Ethical Interpretation’ (2000) 63 
THRHR 595. 
55 didcott J finds that the respondent’s child was over 2 at the time of the application, disqualifying 
him from relief (para 57) However, as the majority of the court had clearly decided to give a judg-
ment in this case, the fact that the complainant might or might not have qualified under the amnesty 
was not an obstacle to a more transformative outcome. 
56 this tension is most visible in the dissenting judgment of Kriegler J (para 0–5) and the concurring 
judgment of o’regan J (para 09–3).
57 these points are mentioned by Kriegler J (para 0) and o’regan J (para 3) but do not form part 
of a strong normative statement of equality.
5 note 39 above.
59 Ibid para . the case had proceeded to the constitutional court via the High court, which had 
confirmed the conviction and exercised its powers of sentencing in terms of s 52 of the criminal 
Law Amendment Act 05 of 997.
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a female.60 A minority dissenting judgment by Langa cJ (Sachs J concurring) 
extended the definition to include male victims of rape as well.6
the case raises interesting issues about transformation. the court offers 
several reasons for its limited expansion of the definition of rape, including 
the need to develop the common law incrementally,62 the principle of legality 
that mitigates against extending the definition of a crime, and the fact that the 
development would entail statutory amendments.63 It also makes strong argu-
ments about the gender-based nature of rape, finding that rape is ‘a crime of 
which females are its systemic target … an act of physical domination … [and] 
an extreme and flagrant form of manifesting male supremacy over females’.64 
Langa J, on the other hand, acknowledged the fact that women were the main 
targets of rape at the same time as he asserted the inherent power dynamics of 
the act of rape to insist on a gender neutral definition.65
the issues in Masiya potentially echo those in Hugo — both cases are 
concerned with the concrete realities of women’s lives and ultimately fail to 
address the needs of another vulnerable group: male rape victims or male 
care-givers. While neither judgment can be faulted for its concern with issues 
of fundamental import for women in South Africa — motherhood and gen-
der based violence, both of which go to the core of gender equality– they 
nevertheless raise difficult questions about transformation. If concerns about 
equality are to do more than expose systemic inequalities and extend legal 
rights and protections to vulnerable and/or excluded groups, then such cases 
need to find ways of recognising structural inequalities and seeking to tran-
scend them. While that might sometimes only be possible in normative terms, 
it is important to envisage a society in which power and subordination are 
delinked from gender. In Hugo, that might have been achieved through a more 
positive assertion of parenting roles. In Masiya, it might (at least partly) be 
achieved by Langa’s partial delinking of rape from gender, and his insistence 
that rape be extended to include male victims as ‘to do otherwise fails to give 
full effect to the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom’, and 
perversely, might even ‘entrench the vulnerable position of women in society 
by perpetuating the stereotypes that women are vulnerable’.66 In the end, both 
cases demonstrate that the Court has been insufficiently proactive in giving 
substantive, transformatory content to our constitutional values.
60 Ibid paras 32 & 45.
6 Ibid paras 75–93.
62 on this aspect of the case see S dersso ‘the role of courts in the development of the common law 
under s 39(2): Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and Another cct 
case 54/06 (0 May 2007)’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 373.
63 Ibid paras 33–36. 
64 Ibid para 36. Interestingly, the amicus curiae, the centre for Applied Legal Studies and tshwaranang 
Legal Advocacy centre, both organisations with a strong history of women’s rights work , had 
provided evidence of the patriarchal and gendered history of rape, and argued for a non-gendered 
definition of rape (para 36).
65 Ibid paras 4–6.
66 note 52 above, paras 0, 5, 6.
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At the same time, this approach is not without risks in a society that has 
strong and conservative views about women. doubtless, there is a concern 
that statements about father’s rights and male rape victims can be used in 
reactionary ways to deviate from, or deny, the real inequalities and subor-
dination that women experience. Arguably, however, if these statements are 
embedded in an understanding of systemic gender-based inequalities, and a 
clear exposition of constitutional values, then they can begin to set new terms 
for democratic debate. If transformation is about change, then it remains 
important to engage precisely those conversations, and to give meaningful 
content to our constitutional values.
c) Women in relationships
Women in South Africa live in a variety of relationships, including marriage. 
Beth Goldblatt’s work has reminded us that many people live in co-habiting 
relationships,67 some through choice but many because the choice to remain 
single, to co-habit or to marry is limited by gendered social and economic 
inequalities. Women are poorer and less powerful than men, and often become 
economically dependant on their partners, unable equally to influence life 
decisions. co-habiting relationships are almost without any form of legal 
protection, and confer no substantive benefits upon a separated or surviving 
partner.6
A transformatory approach to co-habiting relationships would acknowl-
edge and understand the conditions that have shaped the legal exclusion of 
such relationships, as well as the social and economic inequalities that shape 
women’s choices in relationships. It would also set terms for the recognition 
of a broader range of relationships, other than marriage, as fundamental to our 
society, and provide remedies that ensure the affirmation and protection of the 
parties in these relationships, and seek to enhance the choices of vulnerable 
parties within relationships.
the extension of legal rights within co-habiting relationships was consid-
ered in Volks NO v Robinson.69 In this case the Court was asked to find the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 99070 unconstitutional in that 
it excluded partners of co-habiting relationships and thus constituted unfair 
marital status discrimination. Even though the respondent eventually con-
ceded the equality claim,7 a majority of the court rejected this claim, while 
a minority agreed that the Act unfairly discriminated on the basis of marital 
status and gender.
67 o’regan and Mokgoro JJ note that 2.3 million people (or about % of the adult populations) 
described themselves in the 200 census as ‘living together like married partners’ although they 
were not married (Volks NO v Robinson (note  above) para 9). 
6 B Goldblatt ‘Regulating Domestic Partnerships ─ A Necessary Step in the Development of South 
African Family Law’ (2003) 20 SALJ 60.
69 note  above.
70 this Act enables the surviving spouse who is insufficiently provided for in the will of his or her 
spouse to claim reasonable maintenance needs until death or remarriage. 
7 note  above, para 26.
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the majority judgment is disappointing in its limited understanding of 
context, its privileging of marriage and its consequent failure to embrace a 
contextual or progressive idea of cohabitation. the court’s uncritical prioriti-
zation of marriage as a foundation of our society, without any reference to its 
historically racial and gendered nature, allowed it to conclude that it was not 
unfair to discriminate between relationships that attract legal obligations of 
support (marriage) and those that do not (cohabitation). In effect, the majority 
found that it is fair to distinguish between married and unmarried couples, 
even to the detriment of the latter.72 Although the court went on to concede 
that cohabiting couples should have some legal protection, it found that little 
would be achieved by extending the ambit of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act, particularly as this was unlikely to assist women most in need, 
namely poor women who ‘cannot marry despite the fact that they wish to and 
who become the victims of cohabitation relationships’.73 this was due to the 
fact that their problem is not the law, but poverty.
the dissenting judgment of o’regan and Mokgoro JJ was ‘unable to agree’ 
with the finding on discrimination, arguing that it not only ‘defeats the impor-
tant constitutional purpose played by the prohibition on discrimination on 
the grounds of marital status’, but also ensures that ‘marriage will inevitably 
remain privileged’.74 this judgment is more faithful to the legal prescripts of 
substantive equality, speaking to the purpose of the right and basing its conclu-
sions on a comprehensive contextual analysis of marriage and co-habitation, 
and women’s place within these relationships.75 In contrast to the majority, the 
minority applies the court’s equality jurisprudence76 to find that the exclusion 
of co-habiting couples from the Act is unjustified, unfair discrimination. In an 
even stronger dissent, Sachs J criticizes the majority failure to appreciate the 
context of co-habitation and for seeing ‘patterns of gender equality, reinforced 
by the law … as part of an unfortunate yet legally neutral background’.77 this 
dissociation of law and social relations is a recurring theme in the court’s 
conservative and formalist judgments.7
A consideration of context is not completely absent in the majority judg-
ment. the court shows some understanding of the systemic inequalities that 
underpin women’s choices. It recognizes the ‘structural dependence of women 
in marriage and in relationships of heterosexual unmarried couples’, as well 
as women’s economic dependence on men, their lack of power within relation-
72 Ibid paras 56–60.
73 Ibid para 6.
74 Ibid para .
75 Ibid para 0.
76 Ibid para 23.
77 Ibid para 03.
7 Albertyn (note 4 above) 27, 22.
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ships, and the negative consequences of this.79 However, as law is separated 
from social life, so the contextual analysis is both textually0 and intellectually 
delinked from the claim before the court, and shows little appreciation of the 
complexities of cohabiting relationships and women’s position within them. 
Women in co-habiting couples are divided into those who exercise free choice 
(such as, it seems, the complainant, who must live with the consequences 
of so ‘choosing’ not to marry, even in circumstances where law provides no 
protection) and women who have no choice at all (and who require help, but 
from Parliament not the courts).2
the misapplication of the contextual analysis is thus complicated by the 
court’s assumptions about marriage and choice. Marriage is a privileged 
institution. choice is an ‘all or nothing’ concept, where only women who 
demonstrably have ‘no choice’ are worthy of legal protection. In all other cir-
cumstances, choice is apparently exercised by free, autonomous individuals 
and trumps equality ends.3 This essentially libertarian view does not fit with 
substantive equality which requires an understanding of choice that perceives 
‘constraints as coming from history, from the operation of power and domina-
tion, from socialization, or from class, race and gender’.4 As a result, women’s 
choices are not understood by the court.5
A further result of this is that the judgment falls into stereotypical reason-
ing in which women are cast in the role of victims and supplicants, needing 
protection rather than equality, and where women who are not seen as such 
‘victims’ are ultimately ‘undeserving’ of constitutional protection. Although 
a substantive equality approach certainly focuses on the disadvantage women 
suffer, it also requires an affirmation of women’s agency and personhood 
within their conditions of inequality.
In the end, the majority judgment does not apply the prescripts of substan-
tive equality: the judgment demonstrates no real examination of context or 
impact, no affirmation of difference and no nuanced understanding of disad-
vantage. the resultant privileging of legally sanctioned marriage and abstract 
79 note  above, paras 63–4. Interestingly, the court is prepared to judicial notice of these facts, at 
the same time as it rejects the evidence of the amicus curiae on these very points. However, the fact 
that the court finds this evidence not to be relevant to the case is, of course, another indicator of 
its distinction between women who have choice, represented by the complainant, and other women 
who do not (paras 3–35).
0 the discussion on ‘vulnerability and economic dependence’ is placed near the end of the judgment, 
after the conclusion of the equality section (paras 63–66).
 note  above, para 5. this is even more strongly articulated by ncgobo J (paras 92–94) in his 
minority, but concurring, judgment. See also his comments on women being free to withdraw from 
these relationships at will (paras 53, 63, 64). 
2 Ibid paras 59, 63–6.
3 A Phillips ‘Multiculturalism, universalism and the claims of democracy’ in M Molyneux & S 
razavi Gender Justice, Development and Rights (2002) 5, 26.
4 L Finlay ‘Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: the dilemma of the Gendered nature of Legal 
reasoning’ (99) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 6, 96.
5 See also the dissent of Sachs J, paras 54–59, about the nature of women’s choices. For a discus-
sion of choice in this judgment see E Bonthuys ‘Institutional openness and resistance to Feminist 
Arguments: the Example of the South African constitutional court’ (2007) 9 Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law (forthcoming).
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choice results in a negatively gendered and socially conservative judgment.6 
Placed within equality jurisprudence as a whole, Volks NO v Robinson is doc-
trinally contradictory, a case in which substantive equality ends are limited 
by the application of conventional, libertarian/liberal concepts, such as choice 
and marriage. By contrast, the two minority judgments affirm a transforma-
tory idea of society in their recognition of a range of relationships and the 
complexities and inequalities of choice.
d) Women’s (choices and sex) work
Sex work or prostitution was outlawed in South Africa by an amendment to 
the Sexual offences Act in 9. Section 20()(aA) of the Act criminalises the 
sex worker, but not her client, for engaging in sexual intercourse ‘for reward’. 
Prior to that, the act of prostitution was not criminalised, but the activities sur-
rounding it were.7 In Jordan v The State, the constitutional court was asked 
to declare s 20()(aA) and certain other provisions to be unconstitutional, inter 
alia, because they constituted unfair sex and gender discrimination. this was 
an appeal from the High court, which had agreed that the criminalization of 
sex work was unfair discrimination.9
Sex work has been divisive amongst feminists, representing for many the 
sexual exploitation of women in an unequal society, and for others the pos-
sibilities of sexual freedom in an equal society. radical feminism condemns 
sex work as ‘enforced sexual abuse under a system of male supremacy that 
itself is built along a continuum of coercion — fear, force, racism and pov-
erty’.90 For liberal feminists, sex work is a choice that women make, a form 
of ‘work’ that should be supported and protected by law, including decrimi-
nalisation and labour law protection.9 critical feminism questions the liberal 
notion of choice, emphasising rather the unequal socio-economic relations 
that shape the demand for sex work and that present different women with 
different choices:
In some cases these relations present people with a stark ‘choice’ between abject poverty or 
prostitution, or between violence, even death or prostitution. In other cases the ‘alternatives’ 
may stretch to include monotonous, low paid employment, as well as prostitution.92
Sex work is thus diverse, characterized by complex power relations ‘which 
produce a series of variable and interlocking constraints upon action’.93
6 this judgment also places the court to the right of policy development in other parts of the state. 
See the developments described by o’regan and Mokgoro JJ (note  above) paras 4–9.
7 Such as pimping or brothel-keeping. See Jordan (note 9 above) para 44.
 note 9 above.
9 The State v Jordan 2002 () SA 797 (t).
90 n Bingham ‘nevada Sex trade: A Gamble for the Workers’ 99 Yale J of L & Feminism 77, 2. 
See also c MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (97).
9 these ideas are discussed by the SA Law reform commission Adult Prostitution paras 4.4–4.20.
92 J o’connell davidson Prostitution, Power and Freedom (99) 3.
93 Ibid .
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A transformatory approach to sex work in South Africa, itself complicated 
by race and class,94 should, at minimum, recognise the inequalities of society 
that underpin sex work, and which structure the demand for sex work and the 
choices that women make. It should go further to articulate an understanding 
of equality in which sex is not tied to exploitation and inequality, and seek to 
craft a remedy that both protects women and expands the choices available to 
them, including sex work.
For the first time, the Constitutional Court split 6:5 on an issue. The minority 
judgment of o’regan and Sachs JJ has some of the elements of the above. the 
justices agree that the criminalisation of sex workers, who are overwhelm-
ingly women, is unfair sex discrimination. this conclusion is based on an 
understanding that this directly reinforces a pattern of sexual stereotyping 
which the constitution seeks to eradicate.95 It is the fact that the stigma of 
criminalization rests only on the sex worker that is the problem. It reproduces 
deeply entrenched patterns of sexual stereotyping and ‘archetypal presuppo-
sitions about male and female [sexuality and] behaviour in which the female 
sex worker is ‘tainted’, the ‘social outcast’, and ‘morally reprehensible’, while 
the male client is ‘accepted or ignored’, seen to be merely engaging in the ‘sort 
of things that men do’.96
this judgment demonstrates some understanding of the concrete condi-
tions of women’s lives, in which social and economic inequality shape their 
decisions to engage in sex work,97 as well as the systemic inequalities that 
influence the fact of sex work. However, in limiting its concern to the question 
of differential criminalization,9 the judgment implies that the criminalization 
of both sex worker and client would not be constitutionally impermissible. 
Ultimately, even the minority finds it difficult to imagine sex work as any-
thing other than potentially criminal, despite its recognition of the manner in 
which sex work reproduces existing inequalities.99
the majority court’s dismissal of the claim has been widely written about for 
its failure to apply the court’s substantive equality jurisprudence, its mechani-
cal, abstract reasoning and its narrow view of dignity.00 The Court’s superficial 
approach, with no contextual understanding of the substantive issues of sex 
work and the unequal gender relations in society that shape this occupation, is 
a low point in the court’s equality jurisprudence. Its importance, perhaps, is 
94 I Pauw & L Brener ‘naming the dangers of Working on the Street’ (997) 36 Agenda 0; J Wojcicki 
‘race, class and Sex: the Politics of the decriminalisation of Sex Work’ (999) 42 Agenda 97.
95 note 9 above, para 60.
96 Ibid paras 64–65.
97 Ibid paras 66 & 6. 
9 Ibid para 7.
99 on this point in relation to the court’s treatment of dignity see J Barrett ‘dignatio and the Human 
Body’ (2005) 2 SAJHR 525, 539: ‘A society is currently unimaginable that is sufficiently egalitar-
ian and lacking in social judgment to refrain from conferring low social status on a sex worker’.’
00 Albertyn (note 4 above); Bonthuys (note 5 above); S Jagwanth ‘Expanding equality’ in c Murray 
& M o’Sullivan (eds) Advancing Women’s Rights (2005) 3; S Jagwanth & c Murray ‘no nation 
can Be Free When one Half of It is Enslaved: constitutional Equality for Women in South Africa’ 
in B Baines & r rubio-Marin The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence (2005); r Krüger ‘Sex 
Work from a Feminist Perspective: A Visit to the Jordan case’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 45.
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in the manner it confirms the nature of the boundaries of constitutional equal-
ity protection. there are important similarities in the judgments of Robinson 
and Jordan. In both, the court perceives women as having exercised a choice 
(albeit acknowledged to be ‘constrained’ in Jordan0) that ultimately takes 
them outside of the realm of constitutional protection. In both, the concept of 
‘choice’ is based on the idea of autonomous individuals exercising free choice; 
not one that actually understands the constraints of history or power relations 
of gender, race and class. As Bonthuys argues:
If the court recognized women’s real choices, then cohabitation and sex work may appear to 
be rational, although not optimal decisions, and be met with sympathy rather moral and legal 
condemnation.02
unsurprisingly, in both, context is absent (Jordan) or abstract (Robinson). 
Importantly, both are accompanied by minority dissenting judgments, where 
the application of all or some of the legal prescripts of substantive equality 
lead to the opposite conclusions.
v Sexual orientation and tranSFormation
during the 990s, the gay and lesbian lobby succeeded in obtaining the inclu-
sion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of unfair discrimination in 
both the interim and final constitutions. This constitutional protection gener-
ated a remarkable series of equality cases brought by the organized gay and 
lesbian movement to secure the recognition of their lives and relationships.03 
Since the first case in 1998, overturning the criminalization of sodomy,04 the 
courts have extended a range of rights to gay and lesbian couples under s 9(3) 
of the constitution, most recently, the right to marry.05
Sexual orientation cases have been influential in the formation of South 
Africa’s equality jurisprudence and are an important indicator of the bounda-
ries and potential of that jurisprudence as a whole. In considering whether 
these cases have been ‘transformatory’, one would, inter alia, analyse the 
extent to which sexual orientation cases show a nuanced understanding of the 
context and conditions of inequality that shape the lives of gay and lesbian 
people, including race and class factors. one would also expect a deep under-
standing of difference that affirms gay and lesbian choices and relationships in 
a manner that is not constrained by hitherto deeply entrenched and dominant 
heterosexual norms, and that opens up the possibilities of diverse families and 
lifestyles in a truly egalitarian society.
0 note 9 above, para 7.
02 note 76 above, 24 (in manuscript).
03 S croucher ‘South Africa’s democratisation and the Politics of Gay Liberation’ (2002) 2 JSAS 35; 
r Louw ‘A decade of Gay and Lesbian Equality Litigation’ in M du Plessis & S Pete Constitutional 
Democracy in South Africa 1994–2004 (2004) 65.
04 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (note 6 above).
05 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 
(2006)  SA 524 (cc).
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A necessarily brief review of the cases presents a mixed picture. on the one 
hand, the cases do include important passages about the right to be different. 
At the same time, there is a strong normative thread of ‘sameness’ or formal 
equality that suggests that gay and lesbian people are ‘just like us’, and are 
thus deserving of equal rights.06 the strongest expression of difference is 
found in the sodomy case, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice,07 in which the court stated that ‘[t]he desire for equality is 
not a hope for the elimination of all differences’ and spoke about how society 
is ‘demeaned’ by its failure to understand that all groups are equally deserv-
ing or worthy of equal protection by the law. 0 citing the canadian Supreme 
court, Ackerman J writes
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like ‘us’ is entitled to equality. Everyone finds it 
more difficult to say that those who are ‘different’ from us in some way should have the same 
equality right we enjoy’.09
In that case, the court’s relatively brief contextual discussion, while not 
explicitly about the experience of the South African gay community, focused 
on the harms to dignity caused by social and legal exclusion.
Most of the cases that followed concerned claims for rights within gay and 
lesbian relationships or rights of social recognition.0 Starting with National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, there is 
a slippage in the jurisprudence as it reverts to a more formal equality approach 
and the right to sameness. Several authors have argued that the extension 
of rights to these relationships has been subject to the heterosexual norm of 
marriage, and same-sex couples have been granted recognition and rights to 
the extent that they conform to an idea of marriage, but are legally prevented 
from so marrying.2 this has meant that same-sex couples have secured 
extensive rights that are largely denied to unmarried, heterosexual couples 
or co-habitees.
06 these seemingly contradictory themes also reflect different legal and political strategies for rights. 
the ‘just like us’ strategy was a conscious political choice and has been politically very important 
is securing rights akin to marriage. See P de Vos ‘the “inevitability” of same-sex marriage in South 
Africa’s post apartheid state’ (2007) 23 SAJHR (forthcoming).
07 note 6 above.
0 Ibid para 22.
09 Ibid.
0 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (4) SA 266 (cc) (unfair exclusion of 
same sex couples from the provisions of the Judges remuneration and conditions of Employment 
Act  of 99); Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development 2003 (2) SA 9 (cc) 
(finding provisions of the child care Act 74 of 93 unconstitutional for limiting joint adoption to 
married people to the exclusion of same sex couples); J v Director-General, Department of Home 
Affairs 2003 (5) SA 62 (cc) (unfair exclusion of include same-sex partners as parents of children 
conceived by way of artificial insemination under the children’s Status Act 2 of 97). 
 2000 (2) SA  (cc) concerning the issue of immigration permits under s 25(5) of the Aliens control 
Act 96 of 99 to the permanent life partners of same-sex couples.
2 See the discussion in Home Affairs ibid paras 42–53. See also P de Vos ‘Same-sex Sexual desire 
and the re-imagining of the South African Family’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 79; Louw (note 03 above); 
Albertyn (note 4 above).
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despite the contradictory results of sexual orientation cases and Volks NO 
v Robinson,3 the underlying jurisprudence shows remarkable consistency. 
In both instances, there is a direct or indirect valorization of marriage and a 
similar notion of choice, namely that the law should enforce the agreements 
of ‘free, autonomous individuals … [and] eliminate the obvious constraints 
on individual choice and opportunity that emanate primarily from the state 
or from bad motivations of other individuals’.4 In Robinson, the court was 
concerned about the choice ‘not to marry’ of the claimant and (particularly) 
her partner, while in the sexual orientation cases the court is concerned 
with overcoming legal prohibitions on the choice to marry. It grants rights to 
same-sex couples to eliminate the consequences of the state’s legal prohibi-
tion to those relationships that are otherwise ‘the same as’ marriage. In both 
instances, the result is a society in which social inclusion is based on same-
ness, rather than difference, and which limits choice unless exercised within 
the (re)stated boundaries of acceptable relationships.
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie, the court recognized the right of 
same sex couples to marry. Although a hugely important case, it is primarily 
a case about allowing gays and lesbians into the protected social institution 
of marriage without challenging its position and the wider idea of family 
in our law.5 This case also affirms the centrality of the notion of dignity 
to equality jurisprudence: the right to be treated with equal dignity and to 
equal concern and respect, or equal moral worth. this use of dignity across 
the sexual orientation judgments is one that has generated important, but 
fairly abstract, discussions of context — an exploration of the stigma and 
harm caused by the non-recognition of gay and lesbian intimate relationships, 
rather than an exploration of systemic inequalities that give rise to this, and 
their differential impact on different groups.6 the use of dignity and ‘equal 
concern and respect’ is consistent with the overall idea of sameness and social 
inclusion, and thus is not transformatory of norms and institutions. While the 
cases extend the net of recognition and rights, they do not immediately shift 
the dominant norms and institutions, and do not fully embrace a future based 
on difference.
these cases thus demonstrate the powerful tug of formal equality and social 
inclusion of selected groups into the existing institutions and norms. As a 
result, although successful in extending rights, they tend to be more inclusive 
than transformatory.7 In many instances, this was the nature of the claim to 
which the courts responded. Strategically, the idea that those who are per-
3 note  above.
4 Heads of argument of the amicus curiae (centre for Applied Legal Studies) in Volks NO v Robinson 
ibid.
5 B Goldblatt ‘case note: Same-sex Marriage in South Africa — the constitutional court’s 
Judgement’ (2006) 4 Feminist Legal Studies 26. 
6 See eg National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (note 6 above) paras 
20–27; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs (note 00 
above) para 54.
7 c Albertyn (note 4 above) 233.
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ceived as ‘different’ are in fact ‘just like us’ is a powerful one and perhaps far 
more likely to succeed. Equality is classically about the inclusion of outsider 
groups into the status quo through the extension of legal rights, protections, 
benefits etc. This is why Khosa v Minister of Social Development, widely 
hailed as a milestone in equality protection for providing relief to destitute 
permanent residents, is in fact an easy equality case: It merely brought a clas-
sic outsider group into an existing system of benefits. What makes such cases 
transformatory, however, would be an articulation of the nature of the group’s 
exclusion and inequality within an overall understanding of the systemic 
inequalities of our society, and a positive expression of a more egalitarian 
society that dislodges the current hierarchies, dominant norms and institu-
tions. In the sexual orientation cases, it would entail a way of thinking about 
relationships and family law that was not governed by heterosexual marriage 
norms nor by libertarian ideas of choice, but by consistently transformative 
ideas of diversity, human agency, context and choice.
vi  ConCluding remarkS — tranSFormation and SubStantive 
equality
this article suggests that substantive equality is an important mechanism of 
legal and social change, but that it has seldom been applied in a manner that is 
fully ‘transformatory’. While courts can be powerful institutions for achieving 
social inclusion, this had tended to occur within clearly defined institutional, 
doctrinal and normative boundaries that limit the possibilities of fundamental 
shifts in power relations in society. In this final section, I briefly summarise 
and discuss the manner in which the prescripts of substantive equality have 
been applied, and assess the difference that substantive equality makes and 
the extent to which it generates transformation.
a) Context, difference and values
the constitutional court’s emphasis on context and impact enables a trans-
formatory approach by constituting a legal requirement for investigating the 
social and economic position of a claimant and his or her group. Elsewhere,9 
I have suggested that the constitutional court’s approach to context and 
impact is one that fluently describes our history and the broad fault-lines of 
our society. Some of the court’s most detailed contextual analyses concern 
the egregious impact of apartheid and racism in our society.20 In addition, 
discussions on the gendered division of labour, the exclusion and denigration 
of gay and lesbian people, the vulnerability of non-citizens and the impact of 
poverty2 show that the court has begun to address the context of inequal-
 note 4 above.
9 Albertyn (2007) (note 4 above) 0–05.
20 See eg City Council of Pretoria v Walker l99 (2) SA 363 (cc); Moseneke v Master of the High 
Court 200 (2) SA  (cc).
2 Khosa v Minister of Social Development (note 4 above).
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ity in our society in a manner that has contributed to progressive results, for 
example, in the sexual orientation cases.
However, the above review of gender and sexual orientation equality cases 
suggests that the court’s depiction of the context from which it will assess the 
equality problem is limited by its reference to conventional ideas of choice, 
marriage, sexuality and gender roles. this has led to cases where a contextual 
analysis has been ignored, partially applied or applied in an abstract or socially 
conservative manner. Given that much of the contextual analysis is derived 
from judicial notice and selected references to evidence and research,22 the 
extent to which context is addressed is largely dependant upon the judges 
themselves and their approach to adjudication. the opposing majority and 
minority judgments in Jordan and Volks suggest that the approach to con-
text, if not a conscious choice, is strongly influenced by judicial attitudes.23 
However, it is also influenced by the nature of legal arguments and strategies, 
as well as the issue before the court.
A substantive approach to equality recognises that equality does not entail 
the elimination of difference. this has been accepted by the constitutional 
court and has been referred to particularly in relation to the cases on sexual 
orientation. However, the recognition of difference as part of equality, while 
crucial to a substantive understanding of equality, is not necessarily evidence 
of transformative ends. For this to occur, the courts would need to embrace an 
idea of difference that was open to dismantling dominant norms and institu-
tions. to achieve this, courts need to avoid the use of dominant norms as 
comparators for assessing equality needs. this has proved to be particularly 
difficult to imagine. For example, the Constitutional Court has continued to 
use marriage as a dominant, and privileged norm within an understanding of 
difference in gender and sexual orientation cases. unlike Robinson, the sexual 
orientation cases represent a significant shift away from a formal approach that 
valorises marriage as the only institution that can confer particular benefits. 
nevertheless, they still promote a dominant heterosexual marriage norm.
In addition, some of the cases on gender equality show the difficulties of 
developing an idea of difference that is not tied to disadvantage. In both Hugo 
and Masiya, the court has tended towards a protective attitude concerning 
women’s disadvantage (the burdens of motherhood and gender based vio-
lence) which, although defensible, demonstrates the difficulties of articulating 
a more egalitarian world based on an affirmation of gender difference, and 
thus reinforces stereotypical ideas of women as mothers or victims.
one of the most important indicators of a transformative approach is the 
extent to which equality judgments contribute to the dismantling of systemic 
inequalities and the establishment of new norms and conditions. clearly, 
22 For a revealing discussion on this, see the court’s rejection of the research by the amicus curiae in 
Volks NO v Robinson (note  above) paras 3–35. But see the court’s apparent use of this evidence 
in paras 63–6.
23 this raises important questions about the transformation of the judiciary. For a discussion on this 
see Bonthuys (note 5 above).
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this is part of a much larger and longer transformation of society, but one 
would expect equality cases to begin to articulate a more egalitarian world, 
especially through giving meaning to the values and purpose of the right. I 
have argued elsewhere that the court’s interpretation of dignity has limited 
the transformative potential of the right.24 In the cases under review in this 
article, there is little evidence of the development of equality ideals in any-
thing other than fairly abstract terms, such as ‘equal concern and respect’. 
Again, this perhaps demonstrates difficulties with balancing a comprehension 
of disadvantage and a positive expression of the constitutional vision.
Giving more concrete and transformative content to constitutional values 
remains a significant challenge in equality cases. Certainly, one might look 
for a different idea of agency and choice to that expressed in the cases under 
review, a dismantling of patriarchal and heterosexual norms, the breaking 
down of the public/private divide, as well as ideas of equal participation 
within society.
b) Substantive equality: inclusion or transformation?
Does substantive equality make a difference? The answer is undoubtedly in 
the affirmative,25 evidenced most powerfully by the opposing results of the 
majority and minority judgments in the cases of Jordan and Robinson. the 
ability of the Court to extend significant rights to gay and lesbian couples is also 
witness to the positive features of substantive equality. It is a far more difficult 
to asses the inclusionary or transformatory nature of substantive equality. As 
argued above, overall with few exceptions,26 the cases are examples of an 
inclusionary rather than a transformatory approach. the jurisprudence, and 
its application, has not yet reached a point where it can be said to be trans-
formatory and it is probable that a truly transformatory jurisprudence will 
prove to be elusive.
Yet, much is to be said for the power of inclusionary judgments. cases 
such as Jordan and Robinson are regressive in that they embed us in a vision 
of society in which the real concerns of vulnerable groups are not deemed 
worthy of constitutional protection. By contrast, groups defined by their 
sexual orientation, their gender or their permanent residence status have been 
granted a significant array of rights and benefits by the courts. The mere act of 
bringing groups into the constitutional community is indubitably significant 
— bringing practical relief and social affirmation. It also changes the nature 
of the debate as new voices are heard and might in fact ‘assist in setting demo-
cratic norms that may eventually shift the social norms’.27 However, as long 
24 See most recently in Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 33 above) –4.
25 See also on this Jagwanth & Murray (note 00 above).
26 An exception is Sachs J’s minority judgement in Volks NO v Robinson (note  above). 
27 Albertyn (2005) (note 4 above).
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as the terms of inclusion are not radically changed,2 social hierarchies will 
not be dismantled and important groups will remain excluded — in this case 
sex-workers and co-habitees, as well as gay and lesbian families that do not 
conform to heterosexual norms.
c) Continuing change
South Africa’s substantive equality jurisprudence has made significant steps, 
and some regressive moves. change, and particularly transformatory change, 
is incremental. the law is an imperfect mechanism for social and economic 
change. Yet, it is also clear that South Africa’s equality jurisprudence has not 
reached its full potential, and a greater consistency of theory and application 
could strengthen equality as a transformative right.
A particular feature of the cases discussed above is the inconsistency of 
the jurisprudence — not only in application, but also in applying theory to 
concepts. the theory of substantive equality presupposes a particular under-
standing of the world, of inequality that is group-based and systemic, in which 
people’s individual choices/agency are constrained by wider power relations 
in society. It also points to an idea of change that dismantles unequal power 
relations. Any hope of (partly) achieving this through law must be based on 
the development of a jurisprudence that thoroughly reflects this philosophical 
approach. to the extent that this is not achieved in South Africa — as our 
courts still struggle with legal formalism and the social consequences of a 
more radical approach — our equality jurisprudence remains contradictory 
and limited.
In this respect, this article suggests broad areas that could nudge equality 
jurisprudence in more transformative directions. Firstly, it would be particu-
larly important to engage jurisprudentially the court’s interpretation of key 
concepts such as choice, difference, gender roles and family to promote more 
transformative meanings. Secondly, it remains important to generate more 
extensive debates on the interpretation and meaning of values, with a par-
ticular emphasis on how they define a future society in which existing power 
relations and hierarchies are dismantled.
2 the court might argue that it is not their task to change the terms of the debate — as indeed the 
majority did in both Jordan and Robinson. this is incorrect — the courts remain the guardians of 
the constitution and are critical participants and arbiters in giving it meaning. Indeed, such is the 
interpretive power of the court that it gives the constitution meaning even as it refrains from doing 
so. 
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